Diebold voting machines simply cannot be trusted
Published 9/26/06
Here’s a video preview of the topic of my upcoming USA Today (text) column. I was feeling particularly agitated and needed to vent.
And yes, I know I’m still having those stupid “plosive” problems. I’m gonna fix them. Really.
Links:
Rolling Stone, “Will The Next Election Be Hacked?” including an interview with Chris Hood, former Diebold consultant.
Princeton scientists’ demonstration video.
The full paper from Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, and Edward W. Felten at Princeton, “Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine.”
Leland says:
I have a problem with any machine that does not produce a voter verifiable paper record at the time the vote is cast. Diebold has simply taken this fiasco to a new level.
As flawed as Florida’s 2000 vote was, those chads really did have a lot going for them in the way of recording and keeping a record of the vote. In hindsight it really wasn’t the machine at fault as much as the Florida law that allowed subjective interpretation of “the voter’s intent.” (ahhh… The overtime that phrase made for me…)
Ohio has the same system. But their law is very clear. Two or more corners broken on the chad is a vote. One or less is not. It doesn’t get much more simple then that.